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1. Trade unions as new collective entities: 
A historical-dogmatic analysis
1.1. The legal nature of trade unions
1.1.1. The transition from individual right through self-determination 
to collective autonomy
The development of the idea of freedom of coalition was a necessary corollary of the 
forms of dependent work. In the course of the historical development of work performed 
for other persons, in respect of dependent work, collective work soon became more preva-
lent in certain areas.1 In this structure, a sharp contradiction developed between the legal 
presentation of labour relations and the sociological impact of collective performance. 
Private labour law of contractual liberalism strictly stood behind individual contractual 
1  Although collective performance developed differently in some work areas, practically it was present 
almost everywhere. It can be clearly demonstrated in certain working relationships even in feudal so-
cieties. Emergence of the beginnings of collective labour law among agricultural hired labourers, the 
guilds or mine workers resulted either in the fall of these forms (see the case of guilds), or most of these 
features were preserved and strengthened (like mine workers, or the class of industrial mine workers 
evolving from manufactures). See this in detail: Plannitz, H.–Buyken, Th.: Bibliographie zur deutschen 
Rechtsgeschichte, Frankfurt a. M., Klostermann, 1983; Ebel, H.: Quellen zur Geschichte des deutschen 
Arbeitsrechts, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1964; Pergolesi, I.: Introduzione al diritto del lavoro, Padua, 
Cedam-Casa, 1958; Dolléans, H.–Dehove, M.: Histoire du travail en France, Paris, Dalloz, 1967; Rogers, 
J. E.: Six Centuries of Work and Wages, London, Batoche Books, 2001 [1884]; Pirenne, H.: A középkori 
gazdaság és társadalom története (Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe), Budapest, Gondo-
lat, 1983; Ogris, W.: Geschichte des Arbeitsrechts von Mittelalter bis in das 19. Jahrhundert, RdA, 1967, 
No. 4. From Hungarian literature, among others, see: Szűcs J.: Városok és kézművesség a XV. századi 
Magyarországon (Cities and Handicraft in Hungary in the 15th Century), Budapest, Művelt Nép, 1955; 
Eperjessy G.: Mezővárosi és falusi céhek az Alföldön és a Dunántúlon, 1689–1948 (Market-Town and Vil-
lage Guilds in the Great Hungarian Plain and Transdanubia), Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1967; Iványi 
B.: Két középkori sóbánya-statútum (Two Medieval Statutes on Salt Mines), Budapest, Századok (Cen-
turies), A Magyar Történelmi Társulat kiadása (Published by the Hungarian Historical Society), 1911. 
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freedom,2 while, on the basis of the actual situation, the focus shifted towards collectiv-
ism. Namely, with the progression of industrial development, the demand for unifying 
individual working conditions at a higher level inevitably came to the forefront. The 
uniform presentation of working conditions, originally expressed by means of individual 
labour contracts, became possible only through the so-called collective agreements. 
However, collective agreements assumed the legal recognition of a peculiar circle of 
subjects – which was completely new, compared to the previous practice. 
The recognition of the new subject has taken place relatively shortly after a brief period 
of contractual liberalism, i.e., labour law soon got free from the approach determined 
by the loi d’Allarde and loi Le Chapelier acts.3 In Germany, the Industrial Confedera-
tion of North German Domains (die Gewerbeordnung des Norddeutschen Bundes) laid 
down measures in this fi eld as early as in 1869. By virtue of the statute, all previous 
prohibitions and sanctions were repealed which had been applied against the agreements 
and conspirations of assistants, apprentices and factory workers, aiming to achieve the 
collective use of more favourable wages and working conditions – with special attention 
to taking up work and dismissal of workers. The right of coalitions to legal action was 
recognized simultaneously, and substantive and procedural legal recognition of coali-
tions was started by these institutions.4 This was of utmost importance because coalitions 
were no longer the subjects of police measures, but they became institutions – at a later 
stage, fundamental institutions – of labour law structure, built on private law principles. 
A similar time-frame and evolution can be found in Austrian law as well. For the fi rst 
time in 1867, the basic law on the fundamental rights of citizens (Staatsgrundgesetz über 
die allgemeine Rechte der Staatsbürger) provided for the citizens’ right of coalition.5 
Perhaps surprisingly, due to certain factors, this process was carried out with more 
diffi culties in Great Britain – which is considered the homeland of trade unionism – than 
in continental legal development. At the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, the Com-
bination Acts prohibited all employer’s combinations and conspiracies and threatened 
them with criminal prosecution.6 Despite the fact that these laws were almost entirely 
2  An excellent example of this is the French Le Chapelier law of 1791, mentioned above, which banned 
any conspirations by employers and employees on the assumption that the contract, as a manifestation 
of the will of sovereign individuals may not be defective.
3  Despite the fact that the criminal code of the Napoleonic era punished the formation of coalitions, it 
was simply impossible to stop this progress with the evolvement of the industrial revolution. Finally, 
recognition of the freedom of association took place in the era of the Second Republic, after 1848. Af-
ter several bypasses, coalition freedom – as a fundamental right – was declared for the fi rst time in its 
entirety in 1864; this was later complemented with the Waldeck-Rousseau law in 1884. Coalitions were 
fi rst legally recognized indirectly, through dissolving prohibitions that had prevented the formation of 
these conspirations. 
4  MünchArbR/Löwisch 1992, § 235, RdNr. 1. 
5  Mayer-Maly, Th.–Marhold, F.: Österreichisches Arbeitsrecht, Bd. I., Wien/New York, Springer, 1991, 
pp. 15–16. 
6  A signifi cant player in the fi ght against mergers was the Anglican Church, whose struggle with other 
religious communities came in handy in the struggle against employee coalitions. This is referred to by 
Halmai G.–Tóth G. A.: Emberi jogok (Human Rights), Budapest, Osiris, 2003, p. 501.
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repealed in 1824,7 the criminal prohibition of employee conspirations was not lifted. 
A famous case of this era was the Hornby v. Close case,8 where it was stated that the 
intention to form a trade union had been against the law because it would have actually 
hindered trade and market development.9 It was in the same year (1867) that a more 
differentiated perception of trade unions emerged on the basis of a report made by the 
Erle Royal Commission. According to this, trade unions were no longer deemed illicit 
on the reason of hindering competition, their members were not allowed to be accused 
of the crime of illegal plot, but collective agreements concluded by them did not have 
any direct effect. The Trade Union Act of 1871 was made on the basis of this report. Its 
signifi cance is given by the fact that it recognized trade unions as autonomous bodies.
The fi rst decades of the 20th century were instrumental to the development of coali-
tions and rights of coalition from the aspect of ideology, too. France is a good example, 
where clarifi cation went so far as to identify the place and function of coalitions in the 
political system.10 With some differences, the same process took place in the history 
of the Italian syndicalism.11 Tarifverordnung,12 issued on 13th December 1918 can be 
considered an important stage of the German development of law, whose substantial ele-
ment was to extend the settlement of wage- and labour-related confl icts to all employers, 
employees and trade unions. Laying down this became necessary because the norms of 
tariff agreements had become legally binding by this decree and applicable to the con-
tracting parties directly and without special conditions. Moreover, it should be pointed 
out that Tarifverordnung introduced the technique and instrument of extended general 
applicability (Allgemeinverbindlichkeit).13 Despite party-political struggles, gradual 
consolidation of labour law continued from the beginning of the 1920s, and, through 
the so-called Ermächtigungsgesetz (1923), the regulation of the resolving system of col-
lective interest confl icts became almost complete.14 In Austria – almost simultaneously 
with German law development – an act was born about collective agreements after the 
end of World War One, which also provided for the resolution of confl icts arising from 
 7  Combination Laws Repeal Act (prepared by Francis Place and the so-called reformers). 
 8  Hornby v. Close, 1867, LR 2 QB 153.
 9  In fact, trade unions were not given the legal assistance that other friendly societies were entitled to. See 
on this: Curthoys, M.: Governments, Labour, and the Law in Mid-Victorian Britain: The Trade Union 
Legislation of the 1870s, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 58–66; Deakin, S.–Wilkinson, F.: 
The Law of the Labour Market, Industrialization, Employment and Legal Evolution, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2004, pp. 206–208; Morris, S. G.–Archer, Th.: Collective Labour Law, Oxford, Ox-
ford University Press, 2000, pp. 43–46.
10  See the congresses held in Montpellier in 1902 and in Amiens in 1906. The so-called La Charte d’Amiens 
laid down the autonomy of coalitions, as well as their political neutrality. See Camerlynck, G-H.: Traité 
de droit du travail, Paris, Dalloz, 1968, p. 597.
11  Treu, T.: Labour Law and Industrial Relation in Italy, Deventer–Boston, Kluwer International, 1991, pp. 
120–121.
12  See RGBl., 1918, p. 1456. (Verordnung über Tarifverträge, Arbeiter und Angestelltenausschüsse und 
Schlichtung von Arbeitsstreitigkeiten). 
13  Däubler, W.: Tarifvertragsrecht, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1993, p. 47.
14  See Verordnung über das Schlichtungswesen (RGBl., 1923, p. 1043). 
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collective agreements.15 Through this act, the normative content of collective agreements 
was recognized: it received mandatory nature. The importance of the legislation lies in 
the fact that from then on it became evident that the tools of labour confl icts in resolving 
confl icts can be looked at as ultima ratio solution only.16 English law development – at 
least formally – differs from that of the states mentioned above in that a collective agree-
ment is not deemed a civilis obligatio; however, this fact has never actually weakened the 
position of coalitions.17 Namely, this was a period when certain acts of great signifi cance 
were adopted, which ultimately transformed the approach to coalitions, including the 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act (1875),18 after some antecedents the Trade 
Union Act (1913) and the Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act (1927).
The beginning of the 20th century and the period between the two world wars – in 
spite of all extremisms – cleared the ground for legal resolution that fi nally determined 
the status of coalitions after World War Two. We can say that the essence of this proc-
ess was that legislation had to react to the activities of coalitions. First of all, the legal 
nature of collective agreements had to be defi ned. Further, the institutional system for the 
peaceful resolution of collective confl icts had to be worked out, and, last but not least, 
“direct actions,” the tools of so-called labour confl icts, had to be addressed. It is appar-
ent, therefore, that irrespective of the direct legal recognition of coalitions, all activities 
and procedures carried out by coalitions came to the forefront of legislation. And this 
process inevitably contributed to the de iure strengthening of the position of coalitions. 
The period that lasts from the end of World War Two to the present day is far from 
being homogeneous from the perspective of the judgment of trade unions, and it differs 
considerably country by country. In the “industrial states” of the 1960s and later in the 
“social states of law,” as frequently quoted, the most important pillar of labour law is 
perhaps the coalition freedom and the activity of coalitions that builds on it. The consti-
tution of many countries – usually in the framework of the right of association – stipu-
lates the right to coalition freedom.19 However, regardless of whether a given country’s 
constitution provides for coalition freedom or not, today it can also be observed that 
employer/employee coalitions and coalition associations appear and cooperate as equal 
social partners. Cooperation of such quality can occur in a professional, sectoral and 
cross-sectoral relation, or in a relation affecting the entire national economy. The high-
15  See Gesetz über Errichtung von Einigungsämtern und über kollektive Arbeitsverträge, 1919.
16  Strasser, R.: Arbeitsrecht, Wien, Manzsche, 1988, No. II., p. 80.
17  Robson, W.: Industrial Law, LQR, 1935, p. 204.
18  This law repealed the Master and Servant Act. Thereby breach of contract by a servant was no longer 
deemed a criminal offence(!). By contrast, the institution of picketing was considered as a criminal of-
fence if it resulted in the harassment of employees willing to pick up work. It also established criminal 
liability if participants of the strike did not provide the essential services or the strike posed a risk to 
human life.
19  The relevant article of the German Basic Law mentions the right in question under the title of freedom 
of association and the prohibition of action against labour fi ght. The Italian constitution stipulates in a 
separate chapter – titled “Economic Relations” – the freedom of trade union organization and activities 
(Kiss, 1995, pp. 77–78). 
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est manifestation of cooperation is the lasting cooperation of employer and employee 
associations, which may even infl uence legislation work. Examples for such, often 
organized, cooperation can be found in several EU member states.20 
However, the statutory regulation of coalitions – especially that of trade unions – is 
not coherent. Labour law regulations of some countries provide for trade unions in detail. 
For example, Code du Travail in France or Codice Civile in Italy provide for trade unions 
in detail. Also, the contents of the laws in the majority of Central European states are 
formed in a similar way. However, there are solutions which do not include any explicit 
provisions on trade unions, but the basic right to coalition freedom is extremely strong. 
German law is a good example of this. § 3, Section (3) of Grundgesetz allows everyone 
and every profession to form organizations for the promotion and protection of work and 
economic conditions. The importance of this is duly demonstrated by the second sentence 
of this article: “Abreden, die diese Recht einschränken oder zu behindern suchen, sind 
nichtig, hierauf gerichtete Maßnahmen sind rechtswidrig.” Content-wise, it represents 
the direct scope of the basic law, which is, by the way, an exception. 
1.1.2. The regulation of trade unions in international treaties, as well as their 
role in the law of the European Union 
International treaties and the law of the European Union serve to ensure and, in some 
areas, to extend the leeway for trade unions. Let me refer to § 20 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and ILO Convention No. 87. The latter includes the most important 
content elements of employer and employee organizations; the so-called preventive 
prohibition clause stands out from among them.21 This means that acquisition of the 
legal personality – as far as these organizations are concerned – may not depend on any 
criteria that would constitute a limitation of coalition rights set out in the Convention.22 
20  In the Netherlands, after World War Two, the so-called “Work Foundation” (Stichting van de Arbeid) 
was established, comprising delegates of representative employer and employee organizations. Its func-
tion is twofold: on the one hand, it allows continuous consultations between employer and employee 
organizations, while, on the other hand, it elaborates recommendations for legislation – especially in 
wage and social matters. See Windmüller, P.: Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the Netherlands, 
Deventer–Boston, Kluwer International, 1969. Along with this organization, there is another important 
advisory body to the Government: the “Social–Economic Council,” which operates as a permanent 
tripartite consultative body. 
  In Belgium, Conseil National du Travail (the National Work Council) is a board operating on a parity 
basis, composed of delegates of the most representative employer and employee organizations and trade 
unions. Since 1968, the scope of the council has signifi cantly increased upon receiving explicit statu-
tory empowerment to conclude collective agreements. See Blanpain, R.: Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations in Belgium, Deventer–Boston, Kluwer International, 1990, pp. 224–245, and also Act of 5 
December 1968, about collective labour contracts and parity committees. 
  In France, there is a consultative body that operates attached to the Minister of Labour. See Despax, 
M.–Rojot, J.: Labour Law in France, Deventer–Boston, Kluwer International, 1987, p. 40.
21  MünchArbR/Löwisch, 1992, § 238, RdNr. 2–5. 
22  ILO Convention, No. 87, § 7. 
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This is supplemented by ILO Convention No. 98. One of its signifi cant statements is 
that employee and employer organizations shall enjoy adequate protection against any 
acts of interference that affect their establishment, functioning or administration. An act 
of interference can be any measure designed to promote, or arrange for, the establish-
ment of workers organization by the employer, or to place such organisations under the 
employer’s control or fi nancial infl uence. Besides, this provision in Hungarian labour 
law had and still has a specifi c meaning, namely in respect of the fi nancial compensa-
tion of working time reduction that affects trade union offi cials (see below.) Finally, let 
me refer to § 11 of The European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which lays down the right of association. The wording 
of Section (1) of the Article is atypical in a way that it addresses the right to form trade 
unions separately.23 ECHR emphasizes in this context that it is not a special, stand-alone 
right, but merely a case of the general freedom of association.24 The Court has established 
that there is no need for any special legal act to form a trade union. Further, as a type of 
association, they do not have any privilege due to their dedication to a specifi c objective, 
which is a characteristic feature of trade unions.25
The process of community legislation is one of the peculiarities of the EU’s law and 
order. Employee and employer coalitions were given a prominent role in the formation 
of Community Directives that affect labour law. Directives 96/34/EC on parental leave, 
97/81/EC on part-time employment, and 99/70/EC on fi xed-term work were announced on 
the basis of framework agreements concluded between European-level employer advoca-
cies and trade unions. All this gives the impression that these advocacy organs conduct 
legislative activity as well, at least in the specifi c legislation of the Community. This role 
has had an effect on the legislation of Member States as well. In several Member States, 
including Hungary, certain initiatives came to the forefront to empower national-level 
coalitions with similar rights. At this point, the debate on coalitions, and the legal nature 
of trade unions in particular, unavoidably intensifi ed. The legal nature of trade unions 
can be defi ned either on the basis of a private law or a public law approach. If defi ned 
on the basis of the former, a trade union is a social, civilian organization that is formed 
on the basis of the general right of association and has a specifi c objective. The defi ni-
tion based on public law is more complex as it tends to furnish these coalitions with a 
role in areas which are characteristic to organizations manifesting state authorities. This 
debate culminated in Hungary in Resolution No. 124/2008 (X. 14.) of the Constitutional 
Court that made a decision in the question of legitimacy and representativity, after all.26
23  “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, 
including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.” 
24  National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, 4464/70, Decision 27/10/1975.
25  See in this context Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v. Sweden, 5614/72, Decision 6/2/1976, and Schmidt 
and Dahlström v. Sweden, 5584/72, Decision 6/2/1976.
26  For an analysis, see Kiss, Gy.: Decision of the Constitutional Court concerning laws on interest recon-
ciliation, Pécsi Munkajogi Közlemények (Pécs Labour Law Notices), 2009, No. 1, pp. 141–148; Héthy, 
L.: Civil beszéd vagy “párt-beszéd”? (Civilian Speech or “Party Talk”?), Budapest, Napvilág Kiadó, 
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1.1.3. Judgment of the legal nature of trade unions on the basis of a legal 
dogmatic approach: Representation 
The emergence of trade unions undoubtedly resulted in individual contractual autonomy 
being replaced by collective self-determination, at least in Western Europe. The process 
is not affected by the fact that this infl uence weakens from time to time or by the fad-
ing of the role of trade unions and collective agreements.27 The prevalence of collective 
institutions can be observed in labour law on both sides.28 On the employers’ side, the 
use of general contract terms is undoubtedly a sign of this, which directly raised the 
question of interpreting the labour contract as a type of consumer contract.29 On the 
employee side, it also became evident that the employers’ legal superordination can be 
balanced through the use of collective tools only, in particular by creating a so-called 
coalition-tariff system. 
However, this has raised doubts. Organizations formed on the basis of the general 
right of association are so-called social organizations. The general objective of these 
organizations is to represent their members’ interests. In the case of trade unions, this 
only means their own membership – in a legal dogmatic sense. However, the existence 
of trade unions is not autotelic as the protection of members’ interest is effectively 
expressed in the collective agreement. In this construction, a trade union concludes a 
collective agreement instead of and on behalf of those whom it represents. Based on this 
interpretation of representation, the effect of the normative part of the collective agree-
ment concluded by the given trade union would only cover the members of the trade. 
However, in the vast majority of European countries, this principle does not prevail, but 
the personal scope of the collective agreement – in case the collective agreements are 
concluded at the employer level – embraces any employees who are in an employment 
relationship with this employer.30 Apart from breaking through the content of the right of 
representation, this principle takes into account that the employer is quasi a natural subject 
2010, pp. 126–148; Sólyom, L.: Pártok és érdekszervezetek az Alkotmányban (Parties and Interest Or-
ganizations in the Constitution), Budapest, Rejtjel Kiadó, 2004, pp. 188–193.
27  Weddernburn, K. W.: Consultation and collective bargain in Europe – Success or ideology?, ILJ, 1977, 
No. 1, pp. 1–34; Allen, V. L.: Power in Trade Unions, London, Longman Green, 1954; Brown, H. P.: 
The Origins of Trade Unions Power, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983.
28  Migsch, E.: Die absolut geschützte Rechtsstellung des Arbeitnehmers, München–Salzburg, Fink Verlag, 
1972.
29  In connection with the use of Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations under English law, see 
Collins, H.: Legal response to the standard form contract of employment, ILJ, 2007, No. 1, pp. 2–18, 
pp. 11–15; Watson, L.: Employees and the Unfair Contract Terms Act, ILJ, 1995, No. 4, pp. 323–336; 
Freedland, M.: The Personal Employment Contract, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp. 190–
192. For case law, see typically Brigden v. American Express Bank Ltd., 2000, IRLR (QBD); Stone, 
R.: The Modern Law of Contract, London, Cavendish, 2002, p. 235. In German law, comprehensively, 
Gotthard, M.: Arbeitsrecht nach Schuldrechtsreform, München, Beck, 2003, pp. 5–19; Annuß, G.: Der 
Arbeitnehmer ist kein Verbraucher!, NJW, 2002, pp. 2844–2846; Fiebig, A.: Der Arbeitnehmer als Ver-
braucher, DB, 2002, pp. 1608–1610.
30  Dokumente 1983: Tarifverträge im Recht der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, EU Dokumente, 1983.
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of the collective agreement and, accordingly, the principle of corporate unit prevails in 
determining the personal scope of the collective agreement. In contrast, a peculiar legal 
construction prevails in German law. In respect of norms relating to working conditions 
(Individualnormen)31 in the tariff contract, the bilateral membership forms the basis of 
the tariff commitment. This specifi cally means that this part of the tariff agreement only 
applies to members of the concluding trade union.32 In practice, however, the effect of 
the above norms also extends to employees who are not members of the trade union that 
concluded the tariff agreement. The theoretical support of this practice is based on the 
institution system of classical private law. Labour law called upon the help of § 328 of 
BGB that provides for the contract concluded to the benefi t of third parties. It should be 
noted here that the legislator rejected the initiative of trade unions urging an act to lay 
down the employer’s obligation to apply the working condition norms of the collective 
agreement only for those trade union’s members who actually concluded the agreement.33 
Along with the problem of the personal scope of the collective agreement, the inter-
pretation of trade unions – as social and civilian organizations – based on representa-
tion structure (in the strict sense of the word) fails in other areas, too. In the context of 
exercising individual trade union rights, regulations of several countries differentiate 
between the concepts of membership and employee. This was observed in the old Hun-
garian Labour Code, too. A similar distinction exists in Sections (6) and (7) of § 272 
of the Labour Code currently in force. The analysis of this phenomenon leads us to the 
subject of law policy judgment of trade unions.
1.1.4. Judgment of the legal nature of trade unions, based on a law policy 
approach: Collective labour law 
Again, the starting point is that a trade union is a social organization, formed on the basis 
of the general right of association. The specifi c mission and commitment of the trade 
union is to protect employees’ social and economic interests. However, this mission not 
only requires a law dogmatic representation approach to the social organization, but we 
also need to reveal the role of trade unions from a law policy perspective, which – in 
my view – overwrites the representation structure in respect of several legal institutions.
The suppression and subsequent recognition of trade unions, along with their coor-
dination with public law, is closely related to the relatively late recognition of the right 
of association and its appearance as a codifi ed right.34 The emergence of trade unions, 
31  These norms are the most important ones, as they contain the tariff provisions relevant to the establish-
ment, termination and content of the employment relationship. See MünchArbR/Löwisch, 1992, § 260, 
RdNr. 1; Däubler, W.: Tarifvertragsrecht, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1993, p. 125; Zöllner, W.–Loritz, K.: 
Arbeitsrecht, München, Beck, 1992, pp. 347–348. 
32  MünchArbR/Löwisch, 1992, § 260, RdNr. 1.
33  Dokumente 1983, 1983, p. 31. 
34  Halmai G.–Tóth A. L.: Emberi jogok (Human Rights), Budapest, Osiris, 2003, p. 51.
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a manifestation of the right of association, triggered even greater resistance from the 
ruling power since in certain places the existence of these alliances and the articulation 
of workers’ interests had been obviously tied to the socialist, and later to the communist, 
ideology.35
The emergence of professional conspirations in the international documents at a later 
stage is of utmost importance from a law policy perspective. In this respect, the content 
of the Declaration of Philadelphia is decisive, according to which “the recognition of 
the principle of the freedom of association is one of the tools in the process to improve 
working conditions and to create lasting peace”. This also means that both employer 
and employee coalitions are high priority social organizations, as it was pointed out by 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court as well.36
Employer and employee coalitions play a key role in the fi eld of the so-called social 
dialogue.37 In the early stage of the development of the Community, the institution of 
social dialogue was basically of bipartite nature, which later tended to shift increas-
ingly towards tripartite consultations. In this role of public law nature, employers’ and 
employees’ advocacies are crucial factors of law policy, which takes shape for the most 
part in the course of adopting Community law. The essence of this is that social partners 
can indirectly constitute the content of individual Directives. Along with the previously 
mentioned framework agreements, several Directives allow certain derogation from 
the primary content since the majority of Directives contains minimum standards only. 
A good example to this is Directive 2008/33/EC on certain questions of organizing 
working time. Agreements between social partners have an important role in respect of 
these derogations. The other Directive where social partners have a strong infl uence is 
Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work, where certain derogation from the 
basic principle of equal treatment is allowed following consultations with social partners 
and/or through collective agreements.
To sum up, the law policy role of employer and employee coalitions attach great im-
portance to these organizations, well beyond the opportunities deriving from the general 
right of association. Consequently, a trade union is a high priority social organization as 
well, whose task also includes the protection of employees’ economic and social interests 
in general, beyond the representation of its membership, in the strict sense of the word. 
It is not by chance that in German law the so-called coalition-tariff system is called a 
35  Note in this context that this attachment was not exclusive, as exemplifi ed by the history of French trade 
unions, too. See Krieger, G.: Das französische Tarifvertragsrecht, Heidelberg, Decker & Müller, 1991, 
pp. 61–66; Pélissier, J.: La fonction syndicale dans l’entreprise, DS, 1984, No. 41. 
36  124/2008. (X. 14.) AB.
37  Ladó, M.–Tóth, F.: Helyzetkép az érdekegyeztetésről, 1990–1994 (General Survey on Interest Recon-
ciliation 1990–1994), Budapest, ÉT Secretariat, 1996; Héthy, L.–Ónódi, I.: A Gazdasági és Szociális 
Tanács, 2004–2007 (The Economic and Social Council 2004–2007), Budapest, Szociális és Gazdasági 
Hivatal, 2008; Héthy, L.: Civil beszéd vagy “párt-beszéd?” (Civilian Speech or “Party Talk”?, Buda-
pest, Napvilág Kiadó, 2010. In an international context, see Hepple, B.: European Social Dialogue – 
Alibi or Opportunity?, London, The Institute of Employment Rights, 1993.
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tool of legitimate confrontation – as opposed to the participation system provided by 
the works constitution.38 
1.2. The trade union’s collective contracting ability 
1.2.1. Judgment of the collective contracting ability from the aspect of the 
right of association 
The legislation and law enforcement of most countries generally recognize the broadest 
concept of coalitions and, as such, provide protection for them, regardless of whether 
or not they have the collective contracting ability.39 This means that the objective of 
coalitions is to be responsible for shaping working and economic conditions, without 
any interference by the state. Consequently, these coalitions perform public functions. 
Therefore, they are given a special status in the constitution. One of the most important 
tasks of coalitions is to (try to) conclude collective agreements. Thus, their activity not 
only affects the private sphere of individual citizens, but it also exerts a signifi cant impact 
on the community’s social and economic life and circumstances as well. Consequently, 
the basic law largely, but not without restraint, facilitates the activity of coalitions.
Coalition freedom and the collective agreement are integral parts of the French labour 
law as well. As far as the constitutional basis of coalition freedom is concerned, labour 
law can in general be said to have been in the shadow for a long time, but some changes 
have occurred only recently. This is perhaps due to the fact that – in the possession of 
an adequate basic law platform – French constitutions focused on the political system. 
Under the constitution, everyone has the right to protect his interests through organized 
actions and to join such organizations based on their own choice.40 The constitutional 
basis of coalition freedom was reinforced by Conseil Constitutionnel in several of its 
decisions.41 In sum, the constitutional basis of coalition freedom is entirely ensured.42 
In French law as well, the basic function of coalition is the protection of the social and 
38  Staudinger/Richardi, 1989, Vorbem. zu §§ 611. ff. RdNr. 832–833.
39  In this respect, see the decision of the German Constitutional Court: “§ 9. Abs. 3 GG schützt auch die 
Koalitionen als solche.” BVerfGE 4, 96 (Hutfabrikant).
40  “Tout homme peut défendre ses droits et ses intérêts par l’action syndicale et adhérer au syndicat de 
son choix.” I do not want to comment here on the debate, which was not cleared up even in the 1990s, 
whether all provisions of the Preamble were applicable in the constitution in force or just those that are, 
with appropriate refi nement, still suitable at this day to form the basis of the law in force. Timeliness of 
this debate on labour law was given by the term “action syndicale”, as it required clarifi cation. How-
ever, law enforcement later withdrew the conceptual framework of organizational actions. See on this 
Verdier, J. M.: Syndicats et droit syndical – Traité du travail, Paris, Dalloz, 1987, No. 44.
41  See Décision No. 80-127 DC des 19 et 20 janvier 1981 – Loi renforçant et protégeant la liberté des 
personnes; 82-144 DC du octobre 1982 – Loi relative au développement des institutions représentatives 
du personnel; 83-162 DC du 20 juillet 1983 – Loi relative à la démocratisation du secteur public.
42  See on this Aliprantis, N.: La place de la convention collective dans la hiérarchie des normes, (Thèse 
Strasbourg), Paris, Dalloz, 1980, pp. 96–98.
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economic interests of members, and a key instrument of this is concluding collective 
agreements. 
In English labour law, common law had been an obstacle to collective self-organisation 
for a long time. The following statement is valid even today: “if the trade unions did not 
appear able in practice to exploit monopoly power, neither were they credited with much 
bargaining power”.43 This classifi cation rightly refl ects, inter alia, the approach of the 
French and English law to differences in the recognition and classifi cation of coalitions, 
while it shows that the impact of common law was stronger than the enforcement of the 
individuality of contractual freedom in continental law.44 This approach softened by the 
beginning of the 19th century – the decriminalization of English labour law happened 
somewhat later.45 The defi nition of trade union is provided in § 1 of the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations (Consolidations) Act of 1992 [TULR(C)RA]. This means that the trade 
union is either a permanent, or even temporary, organization that is composed completely 
or predominantly of employee groups defi ned according to one or several criteria, and 
whose main intention is to regulate relations between the organization and employers 
or employer associations. The legal defi nition of trade unions is signifi cantly narrowed 
down by the following formula: “…whose principal purposes include the regulation 
of relations between workers of that description or those descriptions and employers 
and employers’ associations…”. More precisely, this means that trade unions “need to 
engage in the ‘regulations of relationship’”, which is considerably more than spelling 
out a simple political or professional-policy activity in general, through which it may, 
at the most, exert infl uence on collective labour law relationships.46 This interpretation 
has a key element. In addition to the point that “general political activity” is insuffi cient, 
the referred formula also indicates that these organizations cannot avoid conducting 
collective negotiations on working conditions. 
The conclusions from the above are the following. Trade unions are considered high 
priority social organizations, which explicitly or implicitly perform public law function as 
well. Their most important task – collaborating with the other side – is shaping working 
conditions, which is primarily possible through collective agreements. 
However, here we have to split trade unions as organizations formed on the basis of 
the right of association and with the purpose of protecting the employees’ social and eco-
nomic interests on the one hand, and as organizations which have the ability to conclude 
appropriate-level collective agreements with the other side, on the other hand. This is 
43  Brown, H. P.: The Origins of Trade Unions Power, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, p. 21.
44  Historically, the prohibition of conspirations occurred remarkably soon. The fi rst formal labour law 
statutes were the Ordinance of Labourers, in 1349 and the Statute of Labourers published in 1350. These 
were followed by the Statute of Artifi cers in 1563, decisive for law development for centuries. Prohibi-
tion of everything considered as endeavours of the community to defi ne conditions was typical. These 
situations were subject to criminal law. See in particular R. v. Journeymen-Taylors of Cambridge, 1721, 
8 Mod 10. 
45  The term “decriminalisation of labour law” is used in Deakin, S.–Morris, S. G.: Labour Law, London, 
Butterworths, 1998, p. 9. 
46  Morris, S. G.–Archer, Th.: Collective Labour Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 700. 
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because the existence of trade unions as social organizations does not in itself assume 
the ability to conclude collective agreements. Something more is needed, beyond the 
freedom of establishment granted by the right of association, that properly empowers 
trade unions to be able to prevent at least the other party’s rejection of their negotiation 
offer aiming to conclude a collective agreement. Before examining the legal nature of 
the ability to conclude collective agreements from the perspective of the created legal 
transaction, we should analyze this ability on the basis of the right of association. 
Trade unions have to perform a specifi c activity in order to protect employees’ social 
and economic interests because shaping working conditions is not feasible without 
collaborating with the other party, namely, with employer coalitions. The weight of 
the individual parties is rather important in this cooperation, which is importance with 
respect to the independence of trade unions, too. The ability of trade unions to conclude 
collective agreements thus means a certain kind of empowerment and reputation – in 
Hungarian law, this is called representativity. This empowerment means more than the 
minimum requirement of the so-called negative prohibitive prevention clause. In par-
ticular, it means that no additional requirement can be tied to the due operation of these 
organizations other than those related to the proper functioning of the organization. 
However, the goal of support and/or representativity is that coalitions of the same level 
should conduct talks and conclude agreements with each other. 
No uniform solution has developed to defi ne collective contracting ability. Legislation 
and law enforcement play different roles in this – different virtually country by country 
–, while the extras that these organizations must possess are articulated in all countries.
In German law, there is no legal defi nition for the concept of collective contracting 
ability (Tariffähigkeit). § 2 of the Act on collective agreements (Tarifvertragsgesetz; 
TVG) recognizes trade unions, individual employers and employer associations as 
tariff partners. However, this does not mean that a trade union – as such – would pos-
sess this ability, simply as a result of its formation. Despite the fact that neither TVG 
nor any other law describes the concept of the trade union, the Federal Labour Court 
(BAG) made a clear distinction relatively early between trade unions and coalitions in 
general.47 According to the perception of law enforcement, any employee advocacy can 
be considered as tariff-ready if a so-called soziale Mächtigkeit is available.48 According 
to BAG, this particular power is needed to enable the advocacy to actually protect the 
social and economic interests of its own members in a special environment, namely, 
in the process of negotiations with a party of adverse interest – that is, not to conduct 
mere formal discussions and not to conclude meaningless agreements only. The exact 
concept of social power is not mentioned by law enforcement either. However, it lists 
some of the criteria that are necessary to obtain this power. One of them is obviously the 
47  See, inter alia, BAG AP Nr. 25 zu § 2 TVG; BAG AP Nr. 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 39 zu § 2 TVG. More 
recently, BAG 1 ABR 33/78; BAG 1 ABR 32/83; BAG 1 ABR 22/85. From the most recent ones, see 
BAG AP Nr. 55 zu § 2 TVG.
48  See in more detail Hemmen, G.: Durchsetzungsfähigkeit als Kriterium für den Gewerkschaftsbegriff im 
Tarifvertragsrecht, Münster, Waxmann, 1988. 
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headcount of a coalition. The second important criterion is the fi nancial background of 
the organization, which is indispensable in case of a confl ict with an adverse-interested 
party. According to the position of law enforcement, there is a subjective element that 
is essential to reach tariff capability (Tariffähigkeit), namely, the skill and inclination to 
conclude the tariff agreement (Tarifwilligkeit). Accordingly, if an organization’s regulation 
does not include as a task the conclusion – or the endeavour to conclude – a tariff agree-
ment, there is reason to assume that its members have not empowered the organization 
to do so. Therefore, the binding force of any collective agreement, if concluded, may be 
questionable. Earlier, in connection with this criterion, consideration of organizations that 
consciously excluded their tariff capability was contentious. According to the prevailing 
position, the coalition in this case may possess a potential Tarifberechtigung, but no tariff 
capability.49 The system of criteria set up and consistently applied by BAG had not been 
caught in the crossfi re of debates for a long time, although in the literature some experts 
questioned the grounding of the conceptual distinction of coalitions and trade unions.50
In determining the representativity of trade unions, legislation plays a much greater 
role in French law than in German law. The representativity of trade unions has material 
and formal criteria, among which the legislator sought to create concordance. Material 
criteria ultimately do not differ from traditional requirements. Thus, one of the most 
important quantitative criteria is headcount, or more precisely the power represented on 
the basis of headcount.51 Regarding headcount or the power deriving from it, the fi nancial 
49  See on this problem Richardi, R.: Kollektivgewalt und Individualwille bei der Gestaltung des Arbeits-
verhältnisses, München, Beck, 1968, pp. 153–157. 
50  See in particular Däubler, W.–Hege, H.: Koalitionsfreiheit, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1976, RdNr. pp. 101–
146; Däubler, W.: Tarifvertragsrecht, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1993, pp. 71–78. It should be noted here 
that Däubler, consequently, in certain respect disputes the complete denial of tariff contract capacity 
of the so-called ad hoc coalitions, as well. See Däubler, W.: Tarifvertragsrecht, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
1993, pp. 673–674. A signifi cant breakthrough was reached by a case in which BAG also rejected the 
request of an employee advocacy organization. Subsequently, the organization submitted a constitu-
tional complaint. The Constitutional Court found the complaint unfounded and rejected it. The reason 
of rejection was that the submitting organization was not deemed a trade union by virtue of TVG 2. § 
(1) because they did not have the so-called organizational or federative power (Verbandsmacht). Yet this 
would be indispensable to exercise pressure at negotiations with the party who has adverse interests so 
that the organization would be able to enforce its proposition. On the basis of this fundamental require-
ment, the Constitutional Court established that § 9, Section (3) of GG allows and protects only the es-
sential core and central component of coalition freedom. Accordingly, tariff capacity should always be 
measured to contemporary social reality. It follows from this, on the one hand, that coalition freedom is 
not made subject to tariff capacity by the basic law, while, on the other hand, not every coalition has tar-
iff capacity in itself. In fact, this ability means that the given coalition is able to fi ll in areas not covered 
by government regulations with collective agreements. See BVerfGE 58, 233 – Zu den Voraussetzungen 
der Tariffähigkeit einer Arbeitnehmer-Koalition.
51  The importance of this requirement is demonstrated in the decisions taken by Conseil d’État. See CE 15 
décembre 1954; CE 17 juin 1960; CE 26 octobre 1973. It should be noted, however, that law enforce-
ment manages membership headcount and the deriving organizational power rather fl exibly, with the 
observance of given circumstances, the position of the party with adverse interest and, last but not least, 
the desired leeway of the trade union in question. Cf. Krieger, G.: Das französische Tarifvertragsrecht, 
Heidelberg, Decker & Müller, 1991, pp. 44–45. 
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background of the organization must be examined, which is also important in the course 
of discussions with adverse-interested parties or in resolving confl icts. Among quantita-
tive requirements, there is the so-called audience,52 or, in other words, the audition of 
trade unions by the community.53 Similarly to the German law, these criteria might have 
been designed by law enforcement. However, these criteria have different meanings and 
senses on different levels, which is defi ned by law enforcement, namely, by the Code 
du Travail.54 Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the defi nition of representativity 
in French labour law is that law enforcement justifi ed the representativity (représenta-
tivité propre) of the fi ve largest trade unions that operate in the private sector. The real 
stability of the coalition system – and its almost centralized structure – was rendered 
by the recognition of the so-called derived representativity (représentativité derivée). 
The essence of this is that trade unions, which have joined the fi ve big organizations 
that are considered to be representative by the state, have a tariff capability. The system 
has spectacularly split in two, especially since the introduction of the 1982 act as part 
of the Auroux reforms. While law presumes this ability – praesumptio iuris et de iure 
– for trade union affi liates even in the absence of their own representativity, the other, 
basically workplace-level trade unions that did not join must prove their representativ-
ity (représentativité prouvé). From the perspective of the ability to conclude collective 
agreements, the importance of this differentiation is that at workplace level it practically 
depends on the employer’s decision whether they recognize a trade union present there 
as being representative or not. Naturally, there is a way to appeal against the employer’s 
decision before the ordinary court. In contrast, workplace trade unions joining the top 
trade unions mentioned above will automatically obtain representativity. 
In English law the institution of “recognition of the trade union” was developed to 
facilitate the ability to conclude collective agreements, or more precisely to “force” 
employers to carry out negotiations.55 While German law assigned this task mainly to 
law enforcement, and French law to legislation, the English solution is a compromise 
between common law and legislation. The primary mode to recognize trade unions along 
with their tariff capability is the recognition agreement. In this agreement, the parties 
express their will to conclude a collective agreement on the basis of mutual cooperation, 
and designate the general topics that the collective agreement should cover.56 Along with 
voluntary recognition, the statutory recognition of trade unions also exists. This takes 
place if the employer rejects the trade union’s request for recognition or if the above 
agreement cannot be reached between the parties. The Central Arbitration Committee 
52  Pélissier, J.–Supiot, A.–Jeammaud, A.: Droit du travail, Paris, Dalloz, 2002, p. 650; Krieger, G.: Das 
französische Tarifvertragsrecht, Heidelberg, Decker & Müller, 1991, pp. 45–46.
53  Gamillscheg, F.: Tarifverträge über die Organisation der Betriebsverfassung [In FS für W. Herschel], 
München, C. H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1982, p. 111.
54  CT L 2121-1.
55  § 1978 of TULR(C)A provides for the parties of the collective agreement, as well as for criteria of sub-
ject qualities. 
56  Such a sample agreement is presented by Morris, S. G.–Archer, Th.: Collective Labour Law, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 593–596. 
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(CAC) plays a decisive role in this process as this is where employees’ professional 
organizations may turn to for recognition. The main elements of the procedure are as 
follows. First of all, the professional organization must submit its claim to the employer. 
This is the validity condition of the subsequent procedure. The trade union may then 
turn to CAC with its claim containing the employer’s rejection. After this, the commit-
tee has to decide whether the applicant trade union is independent or not and whether it 
meets the requirements on the basis of which their eligibility for concluding a collective 
agreement – as a bargaining unit – can be established. Without going into details, note 
that the employer is obliged to cooperate with both the trade union and CAC during the 
entire process of recognition.57 What are the consequences if the trade union receives 
the certifi cate from the Certifi cation Offi cer?58 In practice, this impact has considerably 
transformed the relationship of trade unions and employers. Despite the fact that under 
English law there is no explicit compulsion to conclude a collective agreement, if the 
trade union has a certifi cation – as recognition of its ability to conclude collective agree-
ments – it is very diffi cult for the employer to avoid signing the collective agreement.59 
In general, it is observed that, as a result of the CAC procedure, agreements are created 
for the most part. 
Although the procedure of recognizing the capability of trade unions to conclude 
collective agreements substantially differs in the three countries examined, there is one 
important common feature in all of the solutions. The empowerment of trade unions is 
closely related to their function: the successful performance of their coalition activity. 
This requires high support of trade unions. There are roughly similar criteria to measure 
such support in each of these countries. I refer to the importance of these criteria right 
at this point, in light of the fact that Hungarian labour law had followed a completely 
different way until Act I of 2012 entered into force. 
1.2.2. Judgment of the ability to conclude collective agreements from the 
perspective of the doctrine of legal transactions 
The legal nature of collective contracting ability came to the forefront in connection with 
the legal nature of the collective agreement. The legal dogmatic debate on the classifi ca-
tion of collective agreements unfolded primarily in countries where this institution was 
subject to legal regulation and became a decisive component of the regulation system 
57  See in detail Lourie, J.: Trade Union Recognition, House of Commons Library, Research Paper No. 
00/55, May 2000. 
58  See details in Statutory Instrument 2000, No. 1300, The Trade Union Recognition (Method of Collec-
tive Bargaining) Order 2000.
59  From the date of the certifi cate, the parties may start negotiations. In case there are diffi culties with the 
agreement for any reason, the trade union may request the intervention or assistance of CAC. If the ef-
forts to conclude the agreement are unsuccessful despite all this, CAC recommends specifi c methods, 
and the parties can then conclude the agreement with the observance of these recommendations. In ad-
dition, CAC may specify the topics to the parties that are recommended to agree on.
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of labour law – this was the case in Germany and France. German law has two differ-
ent perceptions: the so-called doctrine of legal transactions and the doctrine of norms.60 
The essence of the former is an attempt to describe the tariff agreement with traditional 
legal instruments. In this context, the oldest and simplest concept was the representa-
tion theory. According to this, a coalition is merely the representative of members and 
concludes the agreement in their name and on their behalf. However, even the starting 
point of this solution is doubtful, since the formation of a coalition in itself does not 
yet provide an empowerment to conclude a collective agreement. What is more, this 
theory is insuffi cient to justify the possibility of deviation from collective agreements 
in individual labour contracts. Another version of the doctrine of legal transactions is 
the theory of the so-called collective obligatory (contractual) pact. According to this, 
collective will takes precedence over individual will, and what the individual does not 
know or dare to express is also part of the community’s will. There was also the so-
called subjection theory that tried to prove in an extremely complicated way that parties 
subject themselves to the “expert” will of a third person in determining the content of 
the collective agreement. Finally, the doctrine of the so-called private community au-
tonomy was deemed effective and dangerous at the same time, and it was soon rejected 
as “violence on the community from the outside”. Since the solutions under the doctrine 
of legal tariff transactions could neither be justifi ed to support the theory, nor were they 
convincing in practice, those views intensifi ed which considered collective agreements 
a part of objective law. Typically, tariff autonomy was deduced exclusively from state 
authorization or permission. In contrast, there were many who emphasized that tariff 
autonomy does not mean state-dependent – a kind of transferred – freedom of action, but 
it is in fact the breaking of a segment of state sovereignty. Another theory in this group 
deduces parties’ autonomy from the constitution and stipulates, in a fi ne-tuned version, 
that parties are entitled to settle specifi c social relationships (Regelungsbefugnis), but 
they do not have the right to create norms (Rechtssetzungsbefugnis). Others, however, 
go further to voice the opinion that tariff autonomy is merely an delegated legislative 
authorization. As a summary of the above debate, it can be deemed prevailing that the 
doctrine of legal transactions cannot be justifi ed. However, the position of tariff norms 
in the legal system is not clear either. According to this view, tariff norms are on the 
borderline of private autonomy, their status is rather uncertain, and, as a consequence, 
all simplifi ed conclusions may imply a bulk of counter-arguments.61 This wording of the 
German law, although far from being clear, is still remarkable because the effect of the 
tariff agreement extends to the contracting parties only, while its extension to third parties 
is only possible through a state–administrative–legal act. As a result, in German law the 
apparently prevalent perception still is that tariff norms should not be considered on the 
basis of the power assigned to the parties’ by the state, but on that of the autonomy of 
60  The debate is summarized and evaluated by Zöllner, W.: Die Rechtsnatur der Tarifnormen nach deut-
schem Recht, Wien, Manzsche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1966.
61  Zöllner, W.: Die Rechtsnatur der Tarifnormen nach deutschem Recht, Wien, Manzsche Verlags- und 
Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1966, pp. 37–38. 
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their coalition membership.62 Accordingly, collective contracting ability means a special 
capacity for performing collective legal transactions, which is – content-wise – more 
than the traditional contracting ability under private law.63 
The dual content of the collective agreement also raises a number of problems when 
integrating it into French law and order. Despite the fact that the collective agreement 
– as such – undoubtedly constitutes a contract, it cannot be classifi ed in any traditional 
contract type, due to its actual impact.64 As we have seen at the public-law approach of 
collective contracting ability, this ability reaches beyond the simple private-law contract-
ing ability in French law as well. In other words, there is a contract-based creation of 
norms in both countries, which, however, does not mean legislation under public law. 
2. The regulation of trade unions in Hungarian labour law 
2.1. Re-evaluation of the legal nature of trade unions during the period of the 
change of regime
2.1.1. Depoliticization of trade unions
The defi nition of the legal nature of trade unions and setting its leeway in law policy at 
the time of the change of regime are hard to understand without discussing the system 
created by Act II of 1967. The labour law of the so-called new economic mechanism 
aimed at making the labour contract and the employment relationship generally comply 
with the requirements of an agreement, at least formally. However, the regulation of 
trade union rights led to a hybrid result. Trade unions were furnished with unrealistically 
strong rights that would simply have crippled the operations of the employer. Trade un-
ions were entitled with the right to “consensus” and “objection”. The former is merely 
the right of preliminary contribution to a given decision, whose refusal might hamstring 
the employer’s decision mechanism. The right of objection suspends the execution of 
a decision already taken by the employer until enforceable judgment is made about the 
objection.65 Since the canon remained cogent for the most part, collective agreements 
could not fulfi l their function. According to the intention of the legislator, collective agree-
ments of “normative nature”66 should have governed “the rules referring to the rights of 
the company and its workers, as well as the principles referring to its implementation” 
62  Staudinger–Richardi, 1989, Vorbem. 923. zu §§ 611. ff.
63  Staudinger–Richardi, 1989, Vorbem. 927. zu §§ 611. ff. 
64  Despax, M.–Rojot, J.: Labour Law in France, Deventer–Boston, Kluwer International, 1987, p. 245. 
65  See in detail Román, L.: A munkáltatói utasítás érvényessége és hatályossága (Validity and Force of 
Employer’s Instructions), Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1977, pp. 67–71.
66  Hágelmayer, I.: A kollektív szerződés alapkérdései (Fundamental Questions of the Collective Agree-
ment), Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1979, pp. 302–343.
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– within the scope and framework defi ned by the rule of law. However, the distortion of 
this instrument can be traced back rather well on the basis of Directives and “guides” 
that defi ned the contents of agreements, issued by the Minister of Labour and SZOT (the 
National Council of Trade Unions) on the conclusion of collective agreements. These 
substantially narrowed down the parties’ scope of action. 
Trade unions in this period – practically until the change of regime – were functioning 
as the extended organs of the political party, and they basically played a political role in 
workplaces and in other respects as well. According to the Statutes of Hungarian Trade 
Unions, trade unions were mass organizations of Hungarian workers, acting coherently 
with the direction of MSZMP (Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, HSWP), as unifi ed, 
independent organizations. Although the document highlights the volunteer nature of 
membership, Dr. Sólyom’s assessment is still correct, who stated that the membership 
of these organizations was “a forced constraint membership in the sociological sense”.67 
The right of association created the potential of pluralism terminating privileges typical 
to monolithic organizations, which later became the characteristics of public bodies in 
general.68
No matter how controversial the 1967 model was, it did not collapse as long as the 
political system could represent its stability and was able to fi nance non-market mech-
anisms. At the beginning of the 1980s, however, it became self-evident that the centrally 
planned, directed and subsidized economy was defective. The economic change of regime 
was marked by brand new institutions that emerged in both private and public law. Private 
law legislation regulated small businesses, the governance and management of state-
owned companies were reorganized, and fi nally, the adoption of the Act on Economic 
Associations in 1988 questioned the function of the basic institutions of socialist labour 
law. From the perspective of trade unions, Act II of 1989 on the right of association 
was decisive. With the recognition of coalition freedom, advocacy pluralism developed 
which made it impossible to interpret the collective labour law instruments of the Labour 
Code in the traditional way. This situation could no longer be treated by guidelines and 
resolutions;69 a new system of regulations was needed. The full conceptual transforma-
tion of collective labour law was hallmarked by the new strikes law adopted in 1989.70
Along with the right of association and the coalition freedom developed on the base 
of this right, several trade unions have formed. These organizations not only articulated 
their claims towards employers, but they also expressed their interests that differed from 
each other. Trade unions still worked under the legal environment of the LC created 
by the socialist political and economic system, but because of the pluralism it became 
67  Sólyom, L.: Alkotmánybíráskodás Magyarországon (Constitutional Jurisdiction in Hungary), Buda-
pest, Osiris, 2001, p. 514. On actual tasks of similar organizations and their actual position in the politi-
cal system, see Kornai, J.: A szocialista rendszer (The Socialist System), Budapest, HVG Kiadó, 1994.
68  Sólyom, 2001, p. 514.
69  On exercising trade union rights, see Guide 8005/1989 (MüK. 17) On labour law status of employer 
advocacies, see Guide 8001/1990 (MüK. 16). 
70  Act VII of 1989.
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unthinkable to maintain their earlier political role. Political round table talks and, above 
all, the radically changing economic environment also headed towards this direction. At 
the beginning of the 1990s, the depoliticizing of trade unions became absolutely clear. 
The only remaining question was how trade unions as social organizations should be 
regulated. 
2.1.2. The dilemma related to the legal nature of trade unions 
in the beginning of the 1990s 
Act XXII of 1992 was created in a relatively late stage of the process of the change of 
regime. Justifi cation of the law points out that labour market has become part of the 
“economic” market and this must be taken into account by the Labour Code, too. Ac-
cordingly, the previous public administration regulation must be replaced by a private 
law instrument which is more appropriate to the characteristics of employment relation-
ships. The state must strongly withdraw from legal interventions, while cogent legisla-
tion, relating to subjects of the employment relationship, must be exclusively restricted 
to the determination of guaranteed content elements of the employment relationship 
– the identifi cation of the so-called “minimum standards”. Other questions relating to 
the employment relationship must be settled through negotiations by subjects of the 
employment relationship: the employers and employees. This means that, in this new 
situation, governance is not done by the state as owner but on the basis of its public 
order protection function.71
However, the legislator also voiced some of his concerns. According to the Justifi ca-
tion, “however, we have to be prepared that both local and mid-level collective agree-
ments will be created only gradually”. Therefore, the resulting void must be fi lled in by 
the legislator with dispositive rules. It is important, however, that “it will be the task of 
collective agreements to create the regulations that are more favourable for employees”.
Apparently, labour law of the regime change was committed to agreements, especially 
in the fi eld of strengthening the regulative function of collective agreements. However, 
this endeavour failed due to the regulations on trade unions – among other reasons. The 
fi rst issue was the leeway of trade unions. With consideration to earlier traditions, the 
Labour Code defi ned workplace-level activity of trade unions as a basic criterion. In 
other words, work organization became the primary fi eld of trade unions’ activity. This 
solution of the Labour Code in Hungarian labour law was self-evident. However, trade 
unions do not operate on these bases in every country. German labour law is a good 
example, where the so-called Zutrittsrecht, the right of “entry” to the workplace induced 
a lot of debates.72 In some of the European countries – including France and Italy – there 
71  General Justifi cation of Act XXII of 1992. 
72  The problem in fact dates back to 1965, when the debate on recruiting members for trade unions (Mit-
gliederwerbung) took place. This activity of trade unions – deduced from “the nature of the thing” 
– was deemed by the Federal Constitutional Court as one which is indispensable at a workplace under 
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is a defi nite timeframe available for trade unions to exercise advocacy activity in the 
workplace, usually based on the actual number of employees.73 
With the provision laid down in § 19 of the previous LC, trade unions became social 
organizations with a special legal nature. Namely, the legislator assigned to this provi-
sion a special collective legal relationship between the employer and the trade union. In 
particular, it meant that the employer had specifi c obligations towards the trade union, 
which – if not fulfi lled – caused serious consequences to the employer’s legal acts or 
measures. Trade unions’ right to object was still in place, which suspended the execution 
of a decision planned by the employer until enforceable judgment was made about the 
objection. In addition, the employer had similar obligations towards the works council, 
and, in case of non-fulfi lment, the employer’s action (legal act) was merely invalid. 
To sum up, we can say that trade unions’ presence in the workplace – as a self-evident 
leeway – brought several problems to the surface that later overshadowed Hungarian 
labour law. Among others, this caused that no contractually based source system of 
Hungarian labour law has developed until today; thus, collective agreements have but a 
minor infl uence on the content of the employment relationship. In addition, there is the 
misunderstanding of the principle of applying the rule which is more favourable to the 
employee.74 As a result, employers did not show any readiness to conclude collective 
agreements, and trade unions were unable to raise the employer’s negotiating obligation 
to the level of collective agreements.75 This problem raises another question: if a trade 
union is a social organization, to what extent is it necessary or justifi ed to regulate it? 
specifi c circumstances. However, trade unions are entitled to perform this activity only before the start 
or after the completion of work or during break-times. There is, however, a decision to the contrary, in 
connection with trade union propaganda, where the Federal Labour Court decided that the employer’s 
toleration of such activities in the workplace is not justifi ed if other means (such as post or press) are 
also available for the trade union. Cf. BVerfGE 28, p. 295 (Mitgliederwerbung I).
73  See ILO Convention, No. 135 in this connection with this. 
74  Belling, D.: Das Günstigkeitsprinzip im Arbeitsrecht, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1983; Aliprantis, N.: 
La place de la convention collective dans la hiérarchie des normes (Thése Strasbourg), Paris, Dalloz, 
1980. 
75  Failure of the system is demonstrated well by the amendment of the LC in 1999. According to this, 
pursuant to § 31, Section (2) of the LC, if there is no trade union representation at the employer, the 
employer and the works council may regulate all items under § 30, Paragraph (a) in a works agreement. 
§ 30, Paragraph (a) of the LC refers to the normative part of the content of the collective agreement. 
According to this, the works council may agree with the employer on all questions concerning the rights 
and responsibilities deriving from the employment relationship, the exercise of these and the modes of 
their performance, as well as the order of procedure relating to them. The most important element of the 
normative part of the collective agreement is apparently the consensus reached in tariff wage and wage 
improvement, which is the task of the trade union in the dualistic structure of collective labour law sim-
ply because in this formula the trade union is in the possession of the means that make it a real negotiat-
ing partner – if appropriate conditions are met. The reason of this amendment was clear: the content and 
nature of regulation in the LC changed signifi cantly. Basically, earlier the legislator had created several 
bilateral dispositive rules – instead of dispositivity laid down in § 13 of the LC –, with special attention 
to the regulation of working time. In places where a collective agreement was in force, this meant that 
the parties had the option to agree on a more fl exible use of working time even to the detriment of the 
employee (as regards the length of the reference period, the maximum annual rate of overtime, etc.) 
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2.1.3. Formation of regulations on trade union rights: An opportunity 
or a compulsion?
In the above, I referred to the point that the regulation of trade unions in certain coun-
tries can be found in the LC or in other laws, while in some other countries it does not 
exist. I examine the necessity or constraint of regulation here from the perspective of 
Hungarian labour law. Act II of 1967 not only regulated trade unions’ rights relating to 
“this act” in detail, but also laid down such unrealistic rights that primarily demonstrated 
trade unions’ power from a law policy perspective, while the actual exercising of the 
rights did not come to the forefront. During the preparations of Act XXII of 1992 and in 
the course of the formation of trade unions’ scope of activity, the issue of placing trade 
unions in the LC was raised. The discussions held back then are interesting even today, 
due to the following reasons. In case the legislator does not regulate trade unions’ rights 
in detail, then these organizations – as social organizations – can attain a position that 
the other side with adverse interest is unable to annul on the basis of its representativ-
ity referred to above. Of course, this authority (or rather a power opportunity) obtained 
spontaneously is infl uenced by international agreements, as well as EU’s labour law. 
Even in the absence of a comprehensive legislation,76 the legislator provides substantial 
rights for employees’ representations by laying down employers’ obligations assigned 
to individual legal instruments. However, if the legislator regulates trade unions’ rights 
and leeway in detail, he creates a specifi c legal relationship between the employer (em-
ployers’ associations) and trade unions.
Since the LC of 1992 had eventually regulated the legal relationship between the 
employer and the trade union, the following questions arose. Is it allowed to deviate 
from the legal relationship of the employer and the trade union? In other words, is it 
possible to conclude a collective agreement that grants additional rights for trade unions 
to those provided in the LC? Further, what are the legal consequences if the employer 
violates some of his obligations (such as the obligation to inform)? Since the exercis-
ing of certain trade union rights has been made impossible by the employer (and here 
I primarily mean an economic organization), is it possible to restrict or even exclude 
these rights in a collective agreement? 
These questions can be answered on the basis of the original content of the 1992 LC, 
but the dogmatic background of these problems is rather doubtful. Regulation of the 
previous LC had signifi cantly limited trade unions’ leeway, and as a result employers 
did not want to conclude agreements later that would have been more favourable for 
the trade unions. The original version contained certain lex imperfecta rules that later 
ceased to exist – with the simultaneous regulation of trade unions and works councils 
Where there was no trade union – possibly because the employer resisted it –, there was no opportunity 
for a collective agreement and utilizing its advantages. The legislator tried to fi ll this gap with the exten-
sion of the subjective scope of the collective agreement. This construction was in force until 2nd July 
2002. A similar solution is applied in the current LC as well, essentially for the same reasons.
76  See in particular the instruments of collective redundancy and the change in the person of the employer.
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–, and this put the employers in an even more diffi cult situation. Concerning the right 
of objection, taking it over from the LC of 1967 was based on law policy considera-
tions instead of legal dogmatics; its existence during the validity of the previous LC had 
always been controversial.
To sum up, the regulation of trade unions in the Act of 1992 was a constraint and an 
opportunity at the same time. It was a constraint because – as a result of the economic 
processes (primarily the change of structure and approach that came about with privatiza-
tion), as well as of the political attitude in the beginning of the 1990s, and also because 
of the lack of proper regulation – trade unions would not have had any opportunity to 
infl uence the content of the employment relationship.77 Nevertheless, the regulation en-
sured a relatively consolidated cooperation between the employer, the trade union and 
the government, which was perceived as defeat by all three parties in certain periods. 
2.2. Trade unions’ collective contracting ability on the basis of the old LC: 
Catch-22
2.2.1. The reason and content of § 33 of the old LC 
Defi nition of the collective contracting ability was a diffi cult task for the legislator in 
multiple ways. Because the LC’s norms contained the so-called minimum standards, the 
legislator assumed that it would strengthen the instrument of collective agreements if the 
employee-side collective contracting ability was regulated in detail. Justifi cation of the 
LC pointed out that there is no differentiation between collective agreements at or above 
work organization level; however, it defi ned contracting ability differently in this respect. 
§ 32 of the LC only stipulates – as a general rule – that the trade union or employer 
advocacy organization that is independent of the other contracting party in respect of 
its interest representation activities shall be entitled to conclude a collective agreement. 
Based on this wording, an easy conclusion would be that – at the sectoral level – either 
a given employer association or several other employers could conclude a collective 
agreement, with any trade union as they wish. In accordance with rules of the market, 
under such regulation it had been most likely that parties of equal weight would con-
clude agreements, but it is also possible that this regulation would have caused tensions 
without proper control. The reason is that the legislator did not settle the special system 
of criteria which does not derive directly from coalition freedom, but which is indirectly 
necessary to conclude a collective agreement. It is another question, of course, that it 
was not a legislation issue that only a small number of sectoral collective agreements 
had been concluded. 
77  Nonetheless, later on trade unions sometimes protested against this very regulation, stating that it re-
duced the trade unions’ leeway evolving in the background. (See the history of the regulations on em-
ployee responsibility for inventory shortage.) 
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For employer-level collective agreements, the legislator had chosen a completely 
different solution from the one discussed above. According to § 33 of the LC if a trade 
union has representation at the employer, he has collective contracting ability only if his 
candidates have acquired more than 50% of votes at the works council election. If more 
than one trade union has representation at a given employer, there are two solutions. 
The legislator’s intention was to have trade unions create a coalition in order to reach 
greater support from employees. This is expressed in the rather categorical provision 
of Section (3): if more than one trade union has representation at an employer, the col-
lective agreement may be concluded jointly by all trade unions. This requires that the 
candidates of these trade unions jointly obtain more than half of cast votes at the works 
council elections. If there is no way to conclude a joint collective agreement, trade unions 
considered to be representative can conclude the collective agreement on the basis of 
Section (2) of § 29 of the LC, with the condition that candidates of these trade unions 
meet the quota specifi ed for the works council election. Alternatively, if the joint signing 
of the collective agreement by representative trade unions is not possible, then one single 
trade union may also sign the collective agreement with the employer, on condition that 
candidates of the given trade union obtain more than sixty fi ve percent of votes cast at 
the works council election. 
Not only has this solution left many loose ends behind, it also proved to be a con-
ceptual mistake. § 33 of the LC comprised the following problems. The provision was 
cogent both in its system of conditions and in its sequence. In practice, this downright 
paralyzed collective contracting several times, especially in respect of Sections (3) and 
(4) of § 33.78 Judgment of the criterion of collective contracting ability was even more 
crucial. In national legislation, the only criterion is the result reached at the works council 
election. This also means that, in determining collective contracting ability, it is not the 
aspects connected to the purpose of coalition that matter. In this system – let us add: 
necessarily –, aspects like membership headcount, fi nancial background or exertion of 
pressure (realistic negotiation skills) are out of the question. 
With consideration to the structure of Hungarian collective labour law, this solution 
was unjustifi ed, and it involved risks. The legislator had followed the model of German 
(and, partly, Austrian) labour law where the coalition-tariff systems, along with the works 
constitutional system (Betriebs/Arbeitsverfassung), were institutionally separated. Defi ni-
tion of the German Tariffähigkeit is directly independent from works constitutional law. 
At the time of creating the LC of 1992, in the beginning of trade union pluralism, similar 
78  At one of our dominant strategic companies, representative trade unions were supposed to conclude a 
collective agreement jointly, in accordance with § 33, Section (4) of the LC. Candidates of two repre-
sentative trade unions – out of three – obtained more than half of the votes cast for membership in the 
works council. The third representative trade union, however, did not want to conclude the collective 
agreement with the given content. Since law enforcement interpreted the referred provision closely, the 
collective agreement signed by two trade unions was not valid. In an extreme case, this could easily 
mean that the collective contractual will of two trade unions, with representation of 45% each, may be 
prevented by a trade union with representation of 10%.
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criteria should have been established in connection with the defi nition of the collective 
contracting ability – criteria that would have made the support of individual trade unions 
measurable in a relatively precise way. However, this proved to be impossible in practice 
at that time. Nevertheless, the adopted construction contradicts the purpose of coalitions 
and leads to the distortion of collective labour law as a whole. This is well demonstrated 
by the absurd intertwining of §§ 33 and 65 of the previous LC.
2.2.2. The heterogeneous features of representativity 
Mixing, while seemingly separating but in fact conceptually equalizing so-called rep-
resentativity and collective contracting ability, is rather controversial. Seemingly, the 
LC of 1992 defi nes the criterion of representativity in respect of exercising the right 
to object. Accordingly, a trade union should be considered representative if its candi-
dates obtain at least ten percent of votes cast at the works council election. Since this 
criterion did not prove to be “appropriate” in a given case, the legislator decided that a 
trade union should also be considered representative if at least two-thirds of employees 
belonging to the employer’s similar employment group (profession) are members of 
the trade union in question. It is obvious that, due to actual political reasons, so-called 
representativity was bound to different case types, and in the absence of any dogmatic 
considerations. Beyond that, this provision could have led to peculiar solutions. In this 
way, a trade union with very low headcount, if two-thirds of its members are from the 
same employment group, has the same representativity as a trade union with gets itself 
measured at the works council election. 
The artifi cial separation of representativity and collective contracting ability, along 
with the almost arbitrary defi nition of the criteria of representativity, could happen only 
because the legislator was not in the position to defi ne collective contracting ability – 
ne of the most important institutions of collective labour law – in accordance with the 
purpose of coalition. Tying this ability to the result of the works council election could 
even have been acceptable, at least provisionally. However, nobody wanted to bother 
the status quo thus reached. Therefore, an entirely artifi cial solution got conserved, 
which was, so to say, alien to the system. Due to other reasons as well, collective la-
bour law has not yet been able to work as intended; some of its components have been 
exclusively, and rather autonomously, adjusted according to the legislator’s actual will. 
In this system, trade unions did not do their coalition activity, as it is apparent from the 
history of interest reconciliation.79 
79  Ladó, M.–Tóth, F.: Helyzetkép az érdekegyeztetésről, 1990–1994 (General Survey on Interest Recon-
ciliation 1990–1994), Budapest, ÉT Secretariat, 1996; Héthy, L.–Ónódi, I.: A Gazdasági és Szociális 
Tanács, 2004–2007 (The Economic and Social Council 2004–2007), Budapest, Szociális és Gazdasági 
Hivatal, 2008; Héthy, L.: Civil beszéd vagy “párt-beszéd”? (Civilian Speech or “Party Talk”?), Buda-
pest, Napvilág Kiadó, 2010.
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2.2.3. The anomaly of §§ 33 and 65 of the old Labour Code 
The substantive anomaly of the labour law system after the change of regime can be re-
vealed by comparing § 33 and § 65, Section (1) of the 1992 LC. Under § 33 of the old LC, 
collective contracting ability – except for Section (6) – was connected to the result of the 
works council election. Pursuant to Section (6), if in cases under Sections (2) and (3) the 
trade union or its candidates do not obtain more than half of the votes at the works council 
election, the negotiation to conclude the collective agreement has to be conducted, but em-
ployees’ consent is required to sign the agreement. Employees have to vote on this. Voting 
is valid if more than half of the employees entitled to elect the works council participate. 
In other words, if for any reason there was no works council operating at a given 
employer, any trade union with representation at such an employer had practically no 
collective contracting ability. Due to the principle set forth in § 13 on the application 
of working conditions that are more favourable for employees, employers were not in-
terested in concluding collective agreements with trade unions which had no collective 
contracting ability. The legislator did not urge the employer to do so at a later stage either, 
but he allowed agreements with the works council instead. Electing a works council and 
the success of its candidates were therefore in the essential interest of the given trade 
union. This situation in itself provided grounds for the structural and functional mingling 
between the two elements of collective labour law. 
With its rather comic history, § 65 Section (1) of the LC stood on the other side of the 
examined structure. The structure of the text was originally the following: “Works councils 
shall have the right of codetermination with regard to the use of welfare funds, and the 
utilization of welfare institutions and real estate property of such nature, as specifi ed in the 
collective agreement”. In the context of this wording, the following question inevitably 
rises: why is it necessary to identify the existence and content of the collective agreement 
as a condition for exercising this particular right of the works council?80 This position 
was not endorsed by law enforcement. According to the position of the Supreme Court, 
the right of codetermination of works councils in respect of institutions and real estates 
dedicated to and actually used for welfare purposes existed even if the collective agree-
ment did not provide for this.81 The different position of legislation and law enforcement 
elicited debate between works councils and trade unions, followed by the amendment of 
the statute. After its amendment in 2007,82 the structure of the new text of the LC was as 
follows: “Works councils shall have the right of codetermination with regard to 
(a) the appropriation of welfare funds, and 
(b) the utilization of welfare institutions and real estate property of such nature, speci-
fi ed in the collective agreement.” 
80  In this context, justifi cation of the LC only laid down the following: “…the works council has a co-
decision right in connection with the use of funds allocated for social and welfare purposes, as defi ned 
in the collective agreement. Decisions beyond this scope may be made by the employer, independently.”
81  Supreme Court Mfv. II. 10.292/2004, EBH 2004, p. 1148.
82  See § 1 of Act XIX of 2007. 
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According to the justifi cation of this text, “the amendment of the act does not mean 
any textual change, it only makes it unambiguous, for practical purposes, that the term 
‘specifi ed in the collective agreement’ refers to both real estates and fi nancial resources 
of welfare purposes”. To this end, it splits the text of the provision into points (a) and 
(b). Consequently, if works council elections were successful for the trade unions, the 
fi nancial resources for welfare purposes as well as their size, number, value, function, 
etc. was to be included in the collective agreement that will be concluded. In the absence 
of this, the employer was in the position to make a decision without the involvement of 
the works council.83 
To sum up, the previous LC maintained the dysfunctional system of collective labour 
law, where the two qualitatively distinct elements were mingled. The possibility of the 
simultaneous fulfi lment of employers’ obligations was added to this under § 21, Sec-
tion (2) and § 65, Section (3) of the LC. The omission of both resulted in very serious 
consequences. Interest reconciliation played an important part in this system as trade 
unions tried to enforce their interests at the highest possible level, with considerable 
success during that period of time. This process was practically interrupted by resolution 
124/2004 (X. 14.) of the Constitutional Court, which declared the most important pillars 
of interest reconciliation anti-constitutional and annulled them accordingly.84
2.3. The regulation of trade unions in the current Labour Code in force 
2.3.1. Starting point: Evaluation of the objective of collective labour law 
Compared to the previous perception, the LC in force conceptually re-evaluated col-
lective labour law, including the role of trade unions. The approach of the legislator 
was considered by trade unions as a substantial retreat, through which they were, so 
to say, “outsourced” from the world of labour. The shift in emphasis, compared to the 
previous LC, can be measured in the structural transformation of collective labour 
83  The legislator reinforces this process with § 165, Section (1) of LC, according to which employers 
may support the fulfi lment of the employees’ cultural, welfare and health care needs and improvement 
of their living standards. The benefi ts and their extent shall be specifi ed in the collective agreement. 
However, employers may also provide additional support to employees. This provision of the law and 
its rather anachronistic justifi cation are both confusing. In the legislator’s view, “the form and overall 
extent of social support is defi ned in a normative way. Its due form is the collective agreement. The 
employer is not obliged to provide such benefi ts, but if he allocates money for this purpose – and not 
for individual matters –, regulation of the collective agreement becomes necessary.” Apart from the fact 
that the legislator does not answer the question what to do if there is no collective agreement, or what 
is more, there is no trade union either that could conclude the collective agreement, this interpretation 
is contrary to the provisions of § 30 of the LC that stipulate no binding content for the collective agree-
ment. 
84  See Kiss, Gy.: Az Alkotmánybíróság döntése az érdekegyeztetésről szóló törvényjavaslatok tárgyában 
(Decision of the Constitutional Court on Bills about Interest Reconciliation), Pécsi Munkajogi Köz-
lemények, 2009, No. 1, pp. 141–148.
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law as well. Chapter XIX of the LC provides for the general rules of labour relations 
rather summarily – basically in accordance with Directive 2002/14/EC on the general 
framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community. Coali-
tion freedom is also mentioned here, and from this perspective there is one remarkable 
provision in § 231, Section (3) of the LC, where the legislator adopts the content of the 
previous regulation in connection with the workplace (work organizational) presence 
of trade unions. 
In the subsequent part, the LC regulates works constitutional law in striking detail, 
and it seemingly puts great emphasis on the powers of the works council. In its § 264, 
LC provides a list of examples of decision areas where the employer has to request the 
opinion of the works council at least fi fteen days prior to his measures. However, this 
rule is lex imperfecta, as the legislator does not attach any legal consequences to failure 
of doing so. In an international comparison, Hungarian works constitutional system – 
if there is one at all – is totally ineffective, at least from the perspective of employee 
involvement and rights to infl uence.85 On the other hand, an important provision is set 
forth in § 268 of the LC, providing for the so-called works council agreement if there 
is no collective agreement, practically with identical reasons of the similar solution of 
the previous LC. 
The legislator reduces trade unions’ rights to the minimum that a social institution, 
operating in the interest of a specifi c objective, is generally entitled to. (I do not mention 
here the provision on the protection of trade union representatives.) The regulations in 
the current LC fi lled the legal relationship between the employer and the trade union 
with minimum content: trade union rights can be characterized as practically limited to 
the right for information and consultation. 
Since neither the coalition-tariff system, nor the system of works constitutional law 
contain suffi cient counterweight against the unilateral constituting right of the employer, 
several individual labour law instruments are in a vacuum, so their functioning in the 
system of an agreement-based branch of law is uninterpretable.86 It is not an exaggeration 
to say that not even the current LC could create the unity of individual and collective 
labour law. 
2.3.2. Judgment of the legal nature of trade unions on the basis 
of Act CLXXV of 2011 
On the basis of Act CLXXV of 2011 on the right of association, non-profi t status, and 
the operation and funding of civil society organisations, a trade union is an association 
according to its legal status. The law applies to foundations, associations and non-profi t 
85  See, in particular, the German constitutional system for works councils. Cf. Hoyningen-Huene, G.: 
Betriebsverfassungsrecht, München, Beck, 1993.
86  See analyses of § 96, Section (1) of the LC. 
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organizations as defi ned in the CC, as well as to other organizations established on 
the basis of the right of association. According to § 2 Section (6) Paragraph (b) of the 
Act, the trade union – along with the party and the mutual insurance association – is 
not a civilian organization. An association is an organization created on the basis of 
the right of association. The Act may establish different rules than those applicable to 
associations, for the various special forms, such as federations, parties, trade unions, 
as well as for associations conducting activities under the effect of a separate law. 
It is not a requirement to indicate the denomination of the type or form of the asso-
ciation in the name of the association (association of special form). An association 
(association of special form) can be created and operated with a denomination which 
contains a phrase referring to exercising the right of association. § 5, Section (1) of 
the Act says that a community created by natural persons on the basis of the right of 
association shall not be deemed an association if its operation is not regular, or if it 
does not have a registered membership or an organizational structure defi ned in the 
provisions on associations. 
It is evident from the above that the legal nature of trade unions has basically not 
changed compared to the previous regulations. In this context, it is appropriate to look 
at the relevant provisions of CC. Pursuant to § 3 Section 63 of the CC, associations are 
legal persons with registered members, created for the purposes defi ned in their statutes 
in order to achieve their common objectives on a continuous basis. Associations may not 
be formed with the objective of performing economic activities. Associations are author-
ized to perform economic activities only if these are directly related to the achievement 
of the association’s goals.
2.3.3. Trade union rights 
The justifi cation attached to the regulation of trade unions clearly marks the conceptual 
change compared to the previous regulation. The legislator stipulates the following: 
While the Act does not contain any novelties – compared to the previous regulation 
– in the fi eld of the general regulation of trade unions’ legal status (within the frame-
work of the Fundamental Law), it fundamentally alters the position of the so-called 
workplace organ of the trade union (with representation at the employer), as well as 
the obligations of the employer in this respect. 
The justifi cation perfectly refl ects the shift in the legislator’s standpoint. Two of the 
trade union rights, which were considered important in the previous regulation, were 
omitted from the LC, as they generated fi erce debates. One of them is § 25, Section (5); 
the other one is § 23 of the previous LC. The fi rst case is the instrument of fi nancial 
compensation of working time reduction for trade union offi cials. In order to ensure 
that trade unions exercise their rights properly, the legislator provides certain benefi ts 
for trade union offi cials. No specifi c problem arises with this part of the regulation; this 
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instrument – even if not necessarily with this method and content – can be considered 
uite common.87 Originally, the legislator provided for the working time reduction only.88 
The controversial provision was enacted in 1995,89 and the legislator did not attach a 
meaningful justifi cation to it. This provision was contrary to the principles of applying 
freedom of association in labour law, even if the intention of the legislator did not em-
brace this correlation back then. However, sustaining the contractual principle built on 
the requirement of the enforcement of private autonomy at the level of collective labour 
law is possible only if coalitions, representing confl icting interests, are independent of 
each other. The requirement of independence from the social partner representing adverse 
interests – as a characteristic of coalition – can also be deduced from the requirement of 
87  In Great Britain, it is usually based on an agreement – TUC of 1971 provided a major impetus for this. In 
addition, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Services (ACAS) released a document that drafted 
the minimum requirements in this respect. According to this, it is would be appropriate that offi cials 
are entitled to be exempted from work by employers for the duration of their tasks, and also to receive 
remuneration as if they had performed their work. Typically, offi cials in question may bring an action 
against the employer with the industrial tribunal in the case of refusal. Note, however, that in practice 
remuneration is only due for the duration of the exemption if the offi cial fulfi ls advocacy activities in 
respect of the employer of his/her own. However, if he/she is a member of a national organization, he/
she is only entitled for the exemption from work during performing his/her activity outside the company. 
  In Germany, the situation is more complex due to the consistent dualism of labour law. German law 
projects benefi ts to works councils that operate at an organizational level. This solution has become a 
source of tension within the triangle of the employer, the works council and the trade union. Working 
time allowance of trade union offi cials is usually subject to a tariff agreement, however, in practice their 
advocacy activities are not performed in relation to one specifi c employer. Also, several committees are 
established within the framework of work organizations, in which trade unions try to strengthen their 
infl uence. However, from the prevailing standpoint of German employers, the provision of working 
time allowance as a major rule does not embrace the activities of these committees. Note, however, that 
there are several agreements among stakeholders in this area, too. 
  In France, members of délégués personnel are given a maximum of 15 hours per month that is remuner-
ated by the employer. However, the provision that this cannot be to the detriment of the employer was 
interpreted in some places to mean that the employer prevented communication during working time. 
In contrast, members of the section syndicale are not entitled to this type of benefi t, according to a law 
enforcement decision. 
  In Italy, members of the consiglio di fabrica are granted a paid annual leave to participate in the sessions 
of committees to which they were elected. If an employee was elected into a works council of a city 
different from the seat of the employer, he/she may request the employer to compensate his/her loss of 
earnings for the time spent on fulfi lling his/her duties. Ten hours per year are allocated to hold the so-
called works session (assemblea), which are remunerated by the employer. 
  In Spain, there are several agreements in this respect under which the different advocacy organizations 
and institutions of employees are granted a certain monthly time frame in order to fulfi l their task. 
  In Austria, fi nally, one member of the works council has to be exempted from work if there are at least 
150 employees working at the employer, but beyond this provision, offi cials are entitled to several other 
benefi ts as well, on the basis of a separate agreement. 
See this summarized in Szakszervezeti, 1991, pp. 23–82.
88  On the basis of the content of the regulation, it is not so diffi cult to spell out the intention that in places 
where employees are organized at an adequate level, the trade union representative should be granted 
a working time allowance that corresponds to the status of the so-called “independent” trade union of-
fi cial, well-known in the previous system.
89  See § 5, Section (2) of Act LV of 1995.
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volunteering. The requirement of independence of social partners is expressed in interna-
tional labour law norms as well. ILO Convention No. 98 on the application of the right 
of association and the principles of collective bargaining, as already discussed before, 
deals with the prohibition of infl uencing coalitions in detail.90 However, the requirement 
of prohibiting external infl uence is not only relevant in respect of the partner with adverse 
interest, but also in the relation of third persons. This means that the coalition, fi rst and 
foremost, must be independent of all infl uence by the state. This problem is not only 
important in respect of coalition freedom, but it may also cause tension in the case of 
certain types of support granted by the state. 
§ 25 Section (5) can be judged from the perspective of the general purpose of such 
benefi t. This benefi t is merely the exemption from work for a shorter or longer period 
of time, during which the offi cial is entitled for remuneration. The legislator obviously 
assumed that the elected trade union offi cial is in an employment relationship with the 
employer. However, this cannot be set as a requirement and could not be deduced from 
either the Etv. (Act on the right of association) or the new Act on the right of association. 
Consequently, this construction could have been applied only if the trade union offi cial 
had been in an employment relationship with the particular employer with whom other 
members also created employment relationships.91 However, from the aspect of judging 
the instrument, this is just one of the problems. It is more important that exemption from 
work was also assigned to a purpose if the objective of the benefi t had been the proper 
performance of advocacy tasks.92 However, § 25, Section (5) provides for the fi nancial 
compensation “for any unused portion of work-time allowance”. This amount can be used 
by the trade union solely for the purposes of employee interest representation activities. 
The content of this provision is none other than the support of employees’ coalition by 
the party of adverse interest. 
As for the trade union’s right to object, the legislator sets out that there is no inten-
tion in the Act to maintain this instrument any longer. The reasoning is that objection 
“is a legal instrument basically built on the specifi c role of trade unions in the socialist 
90  According to § 2 of the agreement, the coalitions of employees and employers must be provided ade-
quate protection against any intervention by the other as far as their establishment, activity and manage-
ment is concerned, no matter if this happens directly or through their employees or members. Thus, all 
measures shall be considered as an intervention whose objective is to create an employee organization 
under the control of a given employer or employer organization or to support employee organizations 
fi nancially or by other means, with the intention of placing these organizations under the control of a 
given employer or employer organization. Obviously, § 25, Section (5) does not infringe directly the 
provisions of the agreement, but during the time period when fi nancial compensation of working time 
allowance was based on the agreement of the parties concerned, there were several cases in which the 
employer was willing to agree with certain trade unions but not with others. That is why I referred to 
the claim that the legislator’s intention had not been to infl uence trade unions from the employer side, 
nonetheless, this became possible later on – despite the legislator’s will. 
91  In some cases, the employer terminated the employment relationship of the trade union offi cial, who 
remained an elected trade union offi cial even afterwards and thus demanded entry to his previous em-
ployer on the basis of § 19/A.
92  See justifi cation attached to § 25 of the LC. 
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economic and political system, and its regulation by the law is irreconcilable with market 
economy; it unduly and dysfunctionally restricts ownership rights of the employer with 
private law status”. The Justifi cation refers to contradictions brought to surface by the 
previous practice. However, the following sentence of the Justifi cation is important: “The 
law does not exclude opportunities for collective agreements – without restrictions in this 
circle.” The legislator obviously refers to the obligatory (contractual) part of the collective 
agreement that settles the relationship of parties concluding the collective agreement. 
Other trade union rights are included in § 272 of the LC. Below, I will examine Sec-
tions (4) and (5) in a non-exhaustive manner. Pursuant to Section (4) the trade union may 
request information from the employer on all issues related to the economic and social 
interests of employees in connection with their employment. The law does not defi ne the 
concept of “employment-related economic and social interest”. If there is a collective 
agreement between the parties, this can be settled in the obligatory (contractual) part. 
The wording of Section (4) is a good example of minimizing, with special attention to 
the content of Directive 2002/14/EC as well as the lex imperfecta nature of employer’s 
obligations towards the works council. Section (5) sets out that the trade union is entitled 
to express its opinion to the employer concerning any employer actions (decisions) or rel-
evant drafts, as well as to initiate consultations in this connection. But this rule has a fl aw: 
the employer’s obligation to information towards trade unions is not regulated in the LC. 
It seems from the above that the statutory regulation of trade unions completely fi ts 
the legislator’s intention to reduce the infl uence of collective labour law. In my view, it 
is not the regulatory minimizing of trade unions that causes problems in this system, but 
the handling of collective labour law as a whole, with special attention to the pointless 
provisions on the law of workers’ participation. 
2.4. Trade unions’ collective contracting ability on the basis of the current 
Labour CodeC 
2.4.1. The reasons of conceptual change 
At the end of the analysis of the previous solution my conclusion was that the defi nition 
of the trade unions’ collective contracting ability had been alien to the system, and it had 
practically made the enforcement of collective labour law unfeasible. Regulation in the 
former LC had nothing to do with the coalition-type operation of trade unions. What is 
more, it mingled the systems of coalition-tariff and works constitutional law. 
During the preparation of the current LC, the necessity of conceptual change became 
evident. The legislator’s intention was to approximate the criteria generally accepted in 
European countries. However, it was impossible to neglect the period that elapsed since 
the change of regime, along with the politicization and depoliticization of trade unions. 
Finally, a certain compromise was reached, whose essence can be summarized as follows.
The legislator differentiates between trade unions made up of natural persons only and 
trade union associations. In the former case, the trade union has collective contractual 
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ability if the number of its members with employment relationships at the employer 
reaches ten percent of the total number of employees. If an employer’s advocacy con-
cludes a collective agreement with such a trade union, collective contracting ability 
requires that ten percent of the employees under the effect of the collective agreement 
be members of the given trade union. 
§ 276, Section (3) is important here, according to which if a trade union association 
concludes a collective agreement, at least one of its member organizations with repre-
sentation at the employer must comply with the criteria, and its member organizations 
must empower them to do so.93 This rule explicitly intends to signifi cantly facilitate the 
conclusion of higher level collective agreements.
The legislator’s further intent was to ensure that the trade union concluding the col-
lective agreement has a high level of support. Experience shows that at employers where 
there is a chance to conclude a collective agreement, more than one trade unions are in 
operation. In light of § 276, Section (4), trade unions entitled to conclude a collective 
agreement pursuant to Section (2) may jointly conclude the collective agreement. 
2.4.2. The freedom vs. compulsion of coalition 
The dogmatic and historical development of labour law verifi es that labour law can be 
represented only in the unifi ed approach of individual and collective relations. These 
two parts of labour law are not independent legal categories loosely linked to each other, 
but they are a system of elements in a correlative relationship. It is appropriate to say 
in this context that individual labour law characteristically illustrates that the regulating 
function of private autonomy proved to be insuffi cient to display social relationships 
that are subject of the regulation. The aim of the collective norm material had been to 
cease this “obvious insuffi ciency,” and this experiment of historical importance was 
undoubtedly successful.94 Some say, though, that the appearance of actual labour law 
can be connected to the appearance of collective legal instruments.95 
It is apparent that the legislator was challenged to decide the extent he should intervene 
in the autonomy of the parties within the individual contractual relation. However, this 
intervention was necessary because only this gave hope for sustaining the contractual 
principle. As noted earlier, the recognition of collective legal instruments was neces-
sary for the survival, or in some cases, for the development of private autonomy. As the 
objective of labour law’s collective instruments is to sustain power levelling between 
the subjects of employment relationships, the key burden of collective labour law is its 
purpose limitation.
93  See § 15, Section (1) of Act LXXXVI of 2012. 
94  Migsch, E.: Die absolut geschützte Rechtsstellung des Arbeitnehmers, München–Salzburg, Fink Verlag, 
1972, pp. 12–13.
95  Camerlynck, G-H.: Traité de droit du travail, Paris, Dalloz, 1968, p. 12. 
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The correlation of individual and collective labour law instruments means that both 
of them have to be built on the same principle – that of private autonomy –, and, as a 
consequence, “collective labour law” cannot surpass, nor become independent of the 
opportunities deriving from self-determination that defi ne individual relations.96
The term coalition freedom in the title is associated with constitutionalism, the idea of 
the rule of law and fundamental rights. Coalition freedom – that is, the freedom of asso-
ciation – is unquestionable today in the system of fundamental rights of a state governed 
by the rule of law. However, in this context, coalition constraint is not a constitutional 
law category as it serves to express that the balance system of labour law cannot be 
sustained without employee coalitions, the most important system of collective labour 
law. One of the basic objectives of the current LC was to strengthen the contractual 
sources of labour law and, in this context, to create the conditions for concluding col-
lective agreements. Thus, the existence of large employee coalitions would be highly 
desirable from the perspective of the development of Hungarian labour law. Hungarian 
trade unions have apparently moved towards this direction: the Hungarian Trade Union 
Association was established on 6th December 2013.97
3. Summary 
As the title of this study shows, I have tried to summarize trade unions’ law dogmatic 
position and law policy opportunities on the basis of the current LC. Along with other 
Acts, the LC clarifi ed the legal status of trade unions. The legislator’s intention to 
strengthen contractual sources of labour law has been expressed in several legal in-
struments. Thus, the relationship between law and collective agreement has changed: 
(bilateral) dispositivity prevails as a main rule. As a consequence, more opportunities 
have become available for the parties to form the content of the employment relationship 
more fl exibly. A signifi cant change has taken place in the regulation of trade unions’ 
collective contracting ability as well, which, in my view, provides greater opportunity 
for trade unions and trade union associations to force collective bargaining negotiations 
and to conclude such agreements. Eventually, it can be concluded that the legal status 
and law dogmatic position of trade unions are suitable to effectively form the content 
of the employment relationship. 
96  Kiss, Gy.: A piac és az emberi tényező (The Market and the Human Factor), Budapest, Balassi Kiadó, 
1995, p. 168.
97  The founding members of the new federation are: Autonóm Szakszervetek Szövetsége (ASZSZ) (Asso-
ciation of Autonomous Trade Unions), a Magyar Szakszervezetek Országos Szövetsége (MSZOSZ) (The 
National Association of Hungarian Trade Unions) és a Szakszervezetek Együttműködési Fóruma (SZEF) 
(The Cooperation Forum of Trade Unions). According to Point 2 of the Charter of the Association, “[t]
he aim of the federation is to promote and protect the interests of members of member organizations (in-
cluding members of member associations as well; hereafter together: members of member organizations) 
regarding the employment relationship as well as the comprehensive representation and enforcement of 
the social, economic and cultural interests of current, prospective and former employees.”
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However, the entire system of collective labour law regulations practically abolishes 
or deteriorates this opportunity. The structure of collective labour law, along with the 
quantity of regulations also indicates that the legislator intends to assign a greater role 
to employee participation – the so-called works constitution – instead of trade unions. 
However, legislation is lex imperfecta, as it formally contains elements that can generally 
be found in regulations of similar nature, but the employer’s default has no private law 
consequences. Further, the legislator used again the instrument of works agreement to 
replace the collective agreement.98 This method gave rise to debates even at the time of 
amending the previous LC, and the current solution is far from perfect too. This legis-
lation will undoubtedly contribute to utilize the advantages of dispositivity mentioned 
above. However, there is a risk that agreements that are unilaterally advantageous for 
the employer will be concluded. 
In conclusion, the regulation of trade unions had rather mixed results, and now – 
without any law policy tailwinds – it depends solely on trade unions how effectively 
they are able to participate in framing working conditions.
98  See amendment of the previous LC in 1999.
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